Background to series
CHE Discussion Papers (DPs) began publication in 1983 as a means of making current research material more widely available to health economists and other potential users. So as to speed up the dissemination process, papers were originally published by CHE and distributed by post to a worldwide readership.
The CHE Research Paper series takes over that function and provides access to current research output via web-based publication, although hard copy will continue to be available (but subject to charge).
Executive summary
In most sectors of the economy, specialisation is associated with lower costs. Yet some specialised hospitals claim to require more generous funding than general hospitals. This claim is based on the assertion that their patients are different, and that these differences outweigh the cost advantages of specialisation. Unless the basis for this claim can be established, the financial incentives introduced by Payment by Results to encourage cost reducing behaviour will be diluted.
We estimate various multiple regressions in order, firstly, to establish the extent to which the receipt of specialised care is associated with higher treatment costs and, secondly, to evaluate hospital performance in controlling costs. We explore how robust the results are to a range of analytical choices by conducting various sensitivity analyses.
We use the Hospital Episode Statistics and Reference Cost databases to analyse the characteristics and costs of all patients treated in the NHS during 2008/9. Patients are identified as having received specialised care on the basis of specific diagnostic and procedure codes recorded in their medical record. These codes are agreed by clinicians and form the Specialised Services National Definition Sets.
We estimate multiple regression models to assess the extent to which receipt of specialised care increases the cost of treatment. We test the robustness of results to choices about how costs are calculated, how the regression models are specified and how patients are identified as having received specialised care. In addition we assess each hospital's relative efficiency in controlling costs, after allowing for differences in factor prices and a wide range of patient characteristics.
We find that, after allowing for the hospital in which treatment is provided, costs are higher than for other patients allocated to the same Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) if a patient receives one of the following types of specialised service: The implication for Payment by Results is that 'top-up' payments for patients with these markers might be made over and above the tariff associated with the HRG to which they are allocated. We recommend that the size of additional top-up amounts to the percentage increase in costs as reported above, these estimates being derived from our preferred model specification.
However, different values could be adopted, justified on other grounds. These grounds may include:
 Transitional arrangements, notably for children's services, where the recommended value of 20% is substantially lower than the current 78% top-up;
 Materiality, where an additional top-up would have limited financial consequence for those types of specialised services that are delivered to only a small number of patients;
Introduction
This paper reports work undertaken for the Department of Health's Payment by Results (PbR) team to investigate whether:
1. The costs associated with specialised activity are significantly different from non-specialised activity within the same HRG; 2. Any differences in costs between specialised and non-specialised activity are due to differences in cost efficiency.
This helps address the following PbR objectives:
 PbR gets the price 'right' for services, by paying a price that ensures efficiency and value for money for the taxpayer, and incentivises the provision of care that is responsive to individual needs;
 The system is fair and transparent, through consistent fixed price payments to providers based on volume and complexity of activity.
In broad terms, our analysis of data from 2008/9 explores whether patients who receive specialised services as part of their care package have higher costs than those who do not. If so, hospitals that treat more patients who receive specialised care might require top-up payments over and above their PbR tariff income.
In our assessment we also take account of other factors that might explain costs. These factors include the Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) to which the patient is assigned, various sociodemographic, diagnostic and treatment-related characteristics of the patient, and the hospital in which the patient is treated.
In what follows we first briefly set out the reasons why differential payments might be required for specialised services. We then describe how we identify patients as having received specialised care, assign costs to each patient record in HES, assess the costs of provider spells and decide upon an analytical sample. We specify our multiple regression models before providing some descriptive statistics comparing specialised to non-specialised activity. We then estimate models that investigate the extent to which variations in cost are explained by whether or not a patient received a specialised service.
Payment by Results and specialised care
In April 2002 the Department of Health in England started to introduce a new system of hospital reimbursement, called Payment by Results (PbR). Similarly to other healthcare systems, PbR uses a fixed prospective payment that links a hospital's income to the number and case mix of patients treated. Under PbR, payments for hospital care are defined in terms of the healthcare resource group (HRG -the English version of diagnosis related groups) to which each patient is allocated. Some specialist hospitals in England are paid 'top-up' payments over and above their PbR income, with the top-up calculated as a percentage of the relevant HRG tariff. In 2010/11 the top-up amounted to 78% of the tariff for specialised children's care and to 30% of the tariff for specialised orthopaedics services (Department of Health, 2009).
England is not alone in making differential payments to specialist hospitals: such hospitals in other countries with prospective payment also receive additional income over and above that which they would receive from prospective payments alone (Mechanic et al., 1998, Langenbrunner and Wiley, 2002) . However, if PbR is to promote efficiency and ensure value for money both the justification for and size of the higher 'top-up' payments need to be established.
Specialisation ought to reduce costs
It is not immediately apparent why specialist hospitals should claim higher payments at all. The practice seems to go against received economic wisdom dating back at least to Adam Smith's reflection on specialisation and comparative advantage: by specialising in specific types of activity, providers should have lower costs than those providers that undertake a more diverse range of activities. These lower costs are derived from two primary, though not exclusive, sources (Schneider et al., 2008) :
 Economies of scale, whereby the unit cost of treatment falls as volume increases, and  Specialisation, where it is cheaper to concentrate on providing a limited rather than diverse range of activities.
Most sectors of the economy have witnessed a move toward greater specialisation as providers have sought comparative advantage (Essletzbicher, 2003) . Similarly in healthcare over the past twenty years the number of specialist orthopaedic, cardiac or general surgery hospitals in the United States has grown from 29 in 1990 to 91 in 2005 (Shactman, 2005 , Schneider et al., 2008 . But in 2005 the US government imposed a moratorium on further development, concerned primarily that such hospitals were specialising merely on the most profitable procedures (Shactman, 2005) . In contrast, the English government has encouraged specialisation through the creation of treatment centres that specialise in selected elective procedures such as hip or knee replacement or cataract removal, the belief being that treatment centres are able to deliver care at lower cost than can be achieved by hospitals (Department of Health, 2002) .
If the argument that specialisation reduces costs holds in most other sectors of the economy, for specialist hospitals in the United States and for treatment centres in England, why does if it not apply to English specialist hospitals?
Patients receiving specialised care might have higher costs
The reason that the argument might not hold is that, compared to general hospitals, specialist hospitals are treating different types of patients. If so, cost-reducing gains from specialisation might be offset because specialist hospitals attract patients with more complex care requirements.
This potential problem arises because HRGs are imperfect measures of casemix: any system of categorisation will inevitably combine patients with below and above average costs. This is not problematic if there is little variation around the average and if the variation is random. But it would be problematic if particular types of patients have significant higher costs than other patients allocated to the same HRG. These particular patients may be those that require more expensive specialised care. If HRGs fail to account for systematic differences between patients, the PbR price attached to the HRG would be imperfect. Moreover, because patients receiving specialised care are more likely to be treated in specialist hospitals, the payment system would systematically disadvantage these hospitals. The justification for specialist 'top-up' payments, then, is to correct potential imperfections in the HRG classification system.
The objective of the analysis that follows, therefore, is to determine whether and the extent to which patients who receive specialised care are more expensive than those allocated to the same HRG who do not require specialised care.
Data Issues
There are four major issues regarding the data that need to be addressed:
 How to determine whether or not a patient received specialised care;
 How to assign costs to each patient record in the Hospital Episode Statistics;
 How to determine the cost of a provider spell for those patients who have multiple consultant episodes;
 How to arrive at an analytical sample.
Identifying whether a patient received specialised care
For each individual patient treated in an English hospital during 2008/9 we need to ascertain whether or not specialised care was received. To do this we look at the routine information recorded in the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) about every hospital patient treated during the financial year. Each HES patient record includes a number of data 'fields', containing demographic (e.g. age, gender) and clinical information (e.g. diagnosis, procedures performed).
Information in each patient's diagnostic and procedural fields is examined to ascertain whether or not specialised care was received. A patient is assigned a specialised care marker if:
 One of the ICD10 or OPCS codes a designated in the Specialised Services National Definition Set (SSNDS) is present in their HES record (an individual might have more than one marker) (NHS Specialised Services, 2010);  They were treated at an eligible provider, because non-eligible providers should not be providing specialised services. Specialised activity may not necessarily be more costly or complex, since the SSNDS defines activity as specialised if it requires a planning population of over 1 million people, without any specific relation to resource use. 
Mapping of Reference Costs to HES records
 Non-elective with length of stay at or below the non-elective trimpoint:
 Non-elective with length of stay above the non-elective trimpoint:
Assessing the cost of provider spells
Each observation in HES comprises a Finished Consultant Episode (FCE, hereafter "episode"), measuring the time the patient spends under the care of a particular consultant. Similarly hospitals report their costs on the basis of episodes.
Around 90% of patients remain under the care of a single consultant during their entire hospital stay. The remainder are cared for by more than one consultant, most usually because they are transferred from one specialty to another. We can track the episodes pertaining to each individual patient, allowing us to construct a Provider Spell for each patient, measuring the time from admission to discharge. By linking successive episodes for each patient, we are able to take account of the information in all of the records for those patients with multiple episodes.
Multi-episode spells are likely to be more costly than single-episode spells, but there is no agreed method for determining the additional cost. This is important for our analysis because patients who receive specialised care are more likely to have multi-episode spells. In the absence of an agreed methodology we assess the sensitivity our results to three means of determining the cost of multiepisode provider spells:
 SUM: the cost of the provider spell is equivalent to the sum of the costs of each episode in the spell;
 MAX: the cost of the provider spell is equivalent to the most expensive episode in the spell;
 EPI1: the cost of the provider spell is equivalent to the first episode in the spell. 
Selection of the analytical sample
From an initial sample of 17.4m HES episodes, our analytical sample is reduced to 13.5m episodes (and 12m spells) for the following reasons:
 We consider only those patients treated in NHS acute hospitals. Hence, patients treated in mental health, ambulance and primary care trusts and private providers are excluded;
 HES episodes with missing identifier codes (epikey) are dropped, because they cannot be matched to the Reference Cost database;
 We exclude duplicate observations and those showing data inconsistencies, such as admission date posterior to discharge or patients with different ethnicity codes within a spell;
 Reference costs are not reported comprehensively for some types of activity, notably renal dialysis, well babies, mental health, and cystic fibrosis. Details are providing in Appendix  Tables A1 and A2 ;
 The Reference Costs for some hospitals were not provided in a form that allowed them to be matched to HES records. c For all hospitals the numbers of provider spells with unmatched costs are reported in Appendix Table A3 and as a proportion of total activity in Appendix Table A4 ;  We excluded those episodes with a length of stay in excess of 365 days.
In Table 2 we report how we reduced the full HES dataset to our analytical sample. 
Estimation models
The analytical purpose is to examine the extent to which patients who receive specialised care have different costs to other patients allocated to the same HRG. This requires careful construction of the dependent variable.
First, we adjust reported costs by Market Forces Factor (MFF) of the hospital in which the patient was treated. The MFF is an index of geographical variation in the prices of land, buildings, and labour (Department of Health, 2008) and is designed to capture unavoidable factor price differentials that impact on the actual costs incurred by hospitals in producing healthcare services. By adjusting for MFF, we wash out these unavoidable differentials in costs across hospitals.
Second, there are significant estimation problems when comparing jointly the overall population of some 12m patients, who receive very diverse types of treatment. It would be unfeasible to include dummy variables for all 1,400 HRGs as these would introduce incidental parameter biases. To overcome the need to include dummy variables, we instead standardize each patient's cost by the mean cost of all other patients allocated to the same HRG. Thus our dependent variable is defined as the patient's cost standardised to the average cost of patients in the same HRG:
ܿ is the cost of patient i in HRG h in hospital k and ܿ ෝ is the national average cost of all patients allocated to HRG h.
We then need to ascertain why the costs of patients allocated to the same HRG differ. Other than simple random variation, there are three main possibilities:
1. Some patients receive specialised care while others do not; 2. Some hospitals are more cost-efficient than others; 3. Some patients may have cost-driving characteristics not allowed for completely in the construction of HRGs.
We construct four different multiple regression models designed to determine the extent to which the above possibilities explain variation in costs.
Our base model simply regresses each patient's standardised cost against the full set (n=1…N) of specialised care markers (S), which take the form of dummy variables. The model is specified as:
Where the ߚ ′ ‫ݏ‬ are the parameters of interest: if positive and significant, a patient with the specialist care marker has higher costs than do other patients allocated to the same HRG. ߝ captures random error, which is assumed to be normally distributed. Much of the actual variation in costs from one patient to another is unobservable, so the explanatory power of equation 1 (and the models that follow) will be low, as indicated by the R 2 statistic. This is not surprising given that the purpose of the model is not to explain exactly why costs vary from one patient to another. There will be many individual and idiosyncratic reasons driving each individual's costs, hence making them virtually impossible to observe. Rather the purpose is to assess what influence various specific identified factors, most importantly the specialist markers, have in explaining costs. In this base model we assume that the myriad unidentified reasons are randomly distributed among patients and hospitals, with their influence being captured by the random error term. This assumption is relaxed in the other models.
In interpreting the results, note that the coefficients on specialised markers, the ߚ ′ ‫,ݏ‬ represent the difference in standardised costs between patients who do and do not receive specialised services. In fact, if we think about expectations, since we are assuming the zero mean conditional assumption ‫ݕ(ܧ‬ |ܵ ǡǡ) = 0, then ߚ ൌ ‫ݕ(ܧ‬ |ܵ ൌ ͳǡǡ) െ ‫ݕ(ܧ‬ |ܵ ൌ Ͳǡǡ). In order to get a more easily interpretable measure like the percentage increase in costs associated with receipt of specialised care, g n , we need to compute the marginal mean for unspecialised services, so that:
Costs may vary from one patient to another because of the hospital in which they are treated. Our second model explores this possibility. To do so, equation 1 is estimated as a random effects model
Equation 2 thus recognises the multi-level structure of the dataset, with patients (i=1…I) clustered within hospitals (k=1…K). The ‫ݑ‬ is the random effect. This captures the effect of the hospital on the cost of any particular patient treated in the hospital over and above the other explanatory variables included in the model (here, whether and what type of specialised care the patient received). Provided some assumptions are satisfied (which we'll come to) the random effect can be interpreted as a measure of relative hospital performance in controlling costs or, in other words, of relative hospital efficiency. Due to the grouped nature of the data, we estimate standard errors clustered by hospital, capturing the intra-class correlation in the error term ‫ݒ‬ .
This second equation is the preferred model on which top-up payments should be based, this model accounting for the clustering of patients within hospitals but ignoring other patient characteristics that may not be adequately captured by the HRG to which the patient is allocated.
While accounting for the hospital in which they are treated, equation 2 includes only the specialised care markers to explain why the costs of any individual patient might differ from the costs of other patients allocated to the same HRG. In reality, of course, an individual's costs will vary because of other characteristics than merely whether or not they received specialised care and the hospital in which they are treated. To some extent the HRG to which the patient is allocated accounts for these characteristics, but HRGs can only do this imperfectly. There will always be imprecision in the way that patients are categorised to a limited set of HRGs, with some patients having higher or lower costs than others categorised to the same HRG. If the characteristics that might explain an individual's cost are imperfectly accounted for in the construction of HRGs and are not included as explanatory variables in the regression model, their omission might lead to two problems:
 First, the influence of the explanatory variables that are included in the model might be biased. Here this would imply that the estimated influence on cost of whether or not a patient receives specialised care would be imprecise. The influence of specialised care would be over-estimated if the omitted variables are both cost-increasing and positively correlated with receipt of specialised care. This might be the case, for instance, for patients with more complex diagnoses than typical for other patients in their HRG. If these diagnostic characteristics were also included in the model, the result would be a lower estimated influence of specialised care on cost.
 Second, the estimated hospital (random) effects might be biased and, if so, would provide an imperfect measure of relative hospital efficiency. This bias would arise if there are systematic differences across hospitals in the type of patients treated within each particular HRG. For instance, one hospital might attract more complex patients with more diagnostic problems. If this is not taken into account the hospital will appear to have higher costs than it should have given the (inaccurately measured) profile of the patients that it treats.
The solution to both problems is, of course, to take these characteristics into account by including them as explanatory variables in the model. In our third model we consider the extent to which patient characteristics, over and above whether they have received specialised services, explain costs. To do this, we include a set (m=1…M) of additional explanatory variables (X) describing each patient:
d We estimated also a fixed effects specification and compared the models by Hausman tests. The difference in coefficients is not statistically significant, which is not surprising, given the large amount of observations per hospital. The random effects model is preferred as it is more efficient.
The choice of what variables to take account of is, of course, constrained by the available data. The variables we include to describe patient characteristics are derived from information contained in each of the HES records comprising the provider spell for each individual patient. We construct a series of variables measuring the following:
 The socio-economic conditions of the area in which the patient is resident (variables labelled "imd*");
 The presence of various diagnostic markers that may influence cost over and above the HRG to which the patient is allocated and whether or not they receive specialised care. These markers depend on the presence of specific ICD10 or OPCS codes in the HES record and include such things as hypertension, allergies, obesity, diabetes, and history of past disease;
 Whether a patient was transferred into the hospital or is transferred to another hospital, and whether the hospitals in question were eligible or non-eligible providers of specialist services (labelled "tr_*");
 Whether the patient died;
 Whether the patient was admitted as an emergency;
 The number of episodes comprising the patient's provider spell;
 Regional and urban location of the hospital;
 Whether the patient was white;
 The patient's age and gender (and interactions of these).
Our fourth model allows for whether or not a patient received specialised care, for the other patient characteristics that might explain costs and for clustering of patients within each hospital. Estimated as a random effects model, this model takes the general form: We conduct various sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of, firstly, the estimates of the additional cost implications of whether or not the patient received specialised care and, secondly, of the relative cost efficiency of individual hospitals. Specifically we investigate whether:  Results depend on how the cost of the patient spell is determined;
 Results are dependent on whether patients are defined as receiving specialised care only if they are treated in eligible providers;
 The majority of HRGs comprise a mix of patients who do and do not receive specialised care. However, for some HRGs virtually everyone classified to them received specialised care; for other HRGs virtually no-one did. We assess whether results are sensitive to whether or not patients allocated to these HRGs are included in the analysis.
Descriptive statistics
In 2008/09, for approximately 1.5m (12.5%) of patients it was indicated that some kind of specialised activity was delivered as part of the treatment package. Table 3 reports the number of patients with particular conditions who receive specialised services, and shows that, for instance, 360,000 patients received renal care specialised services. For the vast majority of patients, just one specialised service was delivered but around 30,000 patients received more than one specialised service. Some organizations are or have been eligible for top-up payments for some specialised services. We can see from Table 4 that, as would be expected, hospitals which are or have been eligible for topups now or in the past undertake more specialised spells than do other hospitals. The difference can be quite marked, as in the case of specialised neurosciences services, where the list of eligible providers treated ten times the number of patients treated by non eligible providers. The proportion of patients receiving specialised services varies considerably among providers (see Appendix Table A4 ). Overall 12% of patients received specialised services, but the proportion of an individual provider's activity ranged 0.5% to almost 69% (at Papworth). In Table 5 we provide some descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the right-hand side of equations 3 and 4. Patients receiving specialised services are more likely to be male, younger (probably mainly because infants are more likely to require specialised activity, 16% of them at birth), have fewer multi-episode spells, and to have been transferred between hospitals. Some of the patients' characteristics were constructed by referring to ICD10 codes, so there might be some overlap with the diagnostic markers used for the definition of specialised services. However, other than a very small correlation between obesity and morbid obesity services, we found no correlation between the specialised markers and the patients' characteristics. 
Results
We have estimated various equations and explored the sensitivity of estimates to a range of modelling choices. The specialised markers where estimates are statistically significant appear in bold if p<0.001 and in italics if p<0.05. Rather than reporting the coefficients, we report the predicted percentage increase in costs for specialised services, g n , calculated as described previously. The full regression results for equation 4 are reported in Appendix Table A5 .
In our main analysis we present estimates for the four estimated equations and compare results when applying different functional forms, namely linear, logarithmic and generalised linear models. In all of these analyses, the cost of a provider spell is calculated as the sum of the cost of the constituent episodes and each patient is assigned a specialist marker if one of the SSNDS ICD10 and OPCS codes appears in their record and they were treated as an eligible provider.
We consider the sensitivity of these estimates to choices about how the costs of provider spells are calculated, to dropping the requirement that specialised care is defined as being provided in eligible providers only, and to exclusion from the analysis of patients in particular HRGs. Table 6 presents results from the four equations, going from the base specification which includes the dummies for specialised services only (equation 1), two intermediate models (equations 2 and 3) and the full model with patients' characteristics and hospital random effects (equation 4). These equations are estimated with the dependent variable in both linear and logarithmic form. Equations 1 and 3 are also estimated as generalised linear models (GLM), assuming a gamma distribution with a log link. It was not possible to estimate equations 2 and 4 by applying GLM methods, the models failing to converge because of the size and heterogeneity of the data and the complexity of GLM methods.
Estimates across equations and by functional form
In considering the results, there are some general issues to note.
 The level of significance for most specialist markers tends to be consistent across equations and whether estimated in linear, logarithmic or generalised linear form. This means that we can be confident in interpreting (i) a significant (p<0.001) positive coefficient as indicating that the specialist marker has a significant positive impact on cost and (ii) a non-significant coefficient as indicating no significant impact of the marker on costs. Thus, for most specialist markers, significance is not due to incorrect model specification.
 For equations 1 and 3, the linear and generalised linear estimates are very similar. The estimates from the logarithmic models differ, but not in a consistent direction -sometimes the estimates are higher (eg spinal and rheumatology), sometimes lower (eg children, colorectal).
 The size of the estimates is lower in the full specification (equation 4) than in the base model (equation 1). The difference is due to the fact that full specification includes patient characteristics and hospital effects and their inclusion partially purges the effect of specialised services.
 The significance level for cardiology varies according to model specification. In the linear form of equation 1 and in every log specification, cardiology patients who receive specialised care are found to have significantly higher costs than those who do not. In the other linear models, the predicted effects are not significant. These unstable results may be due to the construction of cardiology HRGs, whereby many are populated almost entirely by patients who received a specialised service. This is particularly true for patients receiving coronary artery bypass grafts, valve procedures, and percutaneous coronary interventions. We explore the implications of omitting HRGs such as these in section 6.4.
 For infectious diseases and vascular services, the specialist markers are significant in (some of) the linear models but insignificant in the log models. This instability may be due to the relatively small number of patients classified as having these specialised services.
As indicated earlier, we recommend equation 2 as the basis for determining the size of the mark-up on specialist services, should the estimate be statistically significant. In the case of every specialised marker the predicted effects are larger in equation 1 than in equation 2. This is because equation 1 ignores the influence on costs associated with the hospital in which care was delivered and, consequently, this specification risks over-estimating the impact of the receipt of specialised services on an individual's cost.
 For the colorectal specialist marker the difference between the estimates is negligible. This implies that the higher costs observed for patients who receive specialised colorectal care are not due to the hospital in which they were treated. This would suggest that, for these services, there is little variation among hospitals in the costs of specialised care for these types of patients.
 For other types of treatment, though, the predicted effects differ more markedly, most obviously for spinal, children's and rheumatology specialised services. The differences imply that higher costs are not due solely to whether the patient received specialised services but are also related to the hospital that provided the care. It could be that some hospitals systematically attract more patients with other characteristics that explain higher costs; it could be that these hospitals exert less cost control and are less efficient. Consideration of the other specifications will help disentangle these explanations.
We first consider the former possibility that other patient characteristics explain variation in costs.
Compare equation 1 with equation 3, both of which ignore the clustering of patients within hospitals. This comparison allows us to assess what impact there might be on the specialised markers of taking into account other patient characteristics that might explain costs. Again concentrating only on those specialist markers that are significant, three patterns emerge:
 For some specialist markers there is very little difference between the two estimates. This is the case for the cancer and colorectal markers and implies that patient characteristics do not explain variation in patient costs over and above the influence of the specialist marker.
 For other specialist markers the estimates in equation 3 are lower than those from equation 1. This is so for spinal, neurosciences, cystic fibrosis and children's specialist services. The differences are because patients receiving these types of specialist care also have other characteristics that drive their higher costs. Equation 1 ignored these characteristics and, consequently, their influence was partially captured by the specialist markers.
 In contrast, the estimates for some markers are higher in equation 3 than in equation 1, as seen for rheumatology and orthopaedic specialist markers. This implies a negative correlation between receipt of these specialised services and those patient characteristics that drive costs. At first sight this might seem surprising but consider again the descriptive statistics for these characteristics reported in Table 5 . Those who received specialised services are not always more likely than those who did not to have the potentially cost increasing characteristics.
Sensitivity to calculation of the cost of provider spells
There is no correct way of calculating the cost of a provider spell composed of multiple episodes. For the results presented thus far the cost of the spell is calculated as the sum of the consistent episodes recorded for each patient (SUM). The spell cost could instead be based on the highest episode cost (MAX) or the first episode in the spell (EPI1). We examine what impact this might have on the results by considering the linear form of equation 2, this being chosen because the estimates from the linear specification are very similar to the preferred but un-estimable generalised linear model.
As Table 7 shows, the significance of the estimates does not depend on the calculation, though significance is reduced for vascular diseases when spell costs are based on the highest episode cost (Max).
The size of the estimates varies according to the specialist marker, but usually by less than 2%. There is, however, a difference of 8.3% for cystic fibrosis and a 5.4% difference for vascular diseases. 
Sensitivity to considering specialist care in non-eligible hospitals
As a further sensitivity analysis we assess the impact of allowing for the eligibility of the provider on the results. For the results considered thus far a patient was defined as receiving specialised care if one of the SSNDS ICD10 or OPCS codes was present in their medical record and they were treated as an eligible provider. In Table 8 we re-present the effects for the specialist markers followed by the effects generated after relaxing the condition that specialised services have to be delivered by eligible providers. Both sets of results are derived from the linear specification.
Again concentrating only on the specialist markers that are statistically significant, there are two types of impact:
 For some specialist markers, the effect is not sensitive to whether or not specialised care is defined as being confined to eligible providers. This is the case for the cancer, cystic fibrosis, infectious diseases, rheumatology, colorectal and orthopaedic markers.
 For other markers, the effect on costs of having received specialised care is lower if this care is recognised as having been delivered by non-eligible providers. This is the case for spinal, neurosciences and children's specialised care. 
Sensitivity to exclusion of patients in particular HRGs
Some HRGs are almost exclusively populated by patients who received specialised services. Similarly, there are some HRGs in which no patients received specialised services. The former type of HRG arises because the ICD10 or OPCS codes used to indicate the receipt of specialised care sometimes also serve to indicate the HRG to which patients should be allocated. f Including patients allocated to these HRGs in the analysis may bias the estimated effect on costs of the specialist markers. This is because for the HRGs in which all patients receive specialised care there is no comparative reference group that consists of patients allocated to the same HRG who did not receive specialised care. We assess the impact on the estimated effects of excluding patients allocated to these HRGs from the analysis. We define three categories for exclusion:
 Dropping patients in those HRGs in which everyone is identified as having received specialised care and those HRGs in which no-one is identified as having received specialised care (TRIM1). This reduces the analytical sample by 2.1% (256,517 patients).
f As noted earlier, this is particularly true for patients receiving cardiac care, although the coefficient for the cardiology specialist marker is significant only under the linear form of equation  Dropping patients in those HRGs in which more than 99% of patients or less than 1% are identified as having receiving specialised care (TRIM3). This has a dramatic effect on the analytical sample, reducing it by 52.6% (5,933,359 patients).
Results are presented in Table 9 , again for the linear form of equation 2. To summarise:
 The predicted effects are not sensitive to the first method of exclusion (TRIM1), except for the specialist marker for bone marrow transplantation, which is now significant, and for vascular diseases, which increases from 21% to 28%.
 Compared to the original estimates, the predicted effects increase when applying the second and third methods of exclusion (TRIM2 and TRIM3) for the following markers: bone marrow transplantation, spinal, neurosciences, and vascular diseases. For the rheumatology and colorectal markers, the effects are now insignificant. The effects for the other markers are not substantially changed. 
Estimates of cost efficiency
As already noted, the models that we have estimated have a low R 2 . This is because they are not intended to identify the many reasons why costs might vary among patients. Nevertheless, we are able to assess what proportion of the variation in costs is due to the hospital in which patients are treated. This is indicated by the 'R 2 within' and 'R 2 between' statistics. The latter is consistently much higher than the former, suggesting that patients within the same hospital tend to be more similar to one another than they are to patients seen in other hospitals.
The random effect captures the hospital's influence on costs over and above the influence of the other patient-level variables accounted for in the model. Consequently these random effects can be interpreted as measures of each hospital's cost efficiency. The cost of a typical patient in a hospital with a relatively large random effect is higher than the cost of a comparable patient treated in a hospital with a lower random effect. Interpretation of these random effects as measures of relative cost efficiency is conditional upon having properly accounted for other factors that might explain variation in patient costs.
Consider equations 2 and 4 both of which account for the clustering of patients in hospitals. In equation 2 we account for the HRG to which the patient is allocated and whether or not they received specialised care. Thus the random effects are not contaminated by these factors. But they might be contaminated by other patient characteristics if there are systematic differences in the types of patients that hospitals treat that are not already captured by HRGs and the specialised markers. Equation 4 accounts for these characteristics and, therefore, the random effects from this specification provide a more accurate indication of each hospital's relative cost efficiency than does equation 2.
That said there is little practical difference between the two sets of random effects, the correlation amounting to 97.3%. This implies that patients do not differ systematically across hospitals in terms of the set of characteristics that are accounted for in equation 4. 
OLS -linear OLS -loglinear
Predicted random effects based on full models estimate
Conclusion
Unless the basis for the claims that specialist hospitals require top-up payments can be established, the financial incentives introduced by prospective payment to encourage cost reducing behaviour will be diluted. In this paper we have explored the basis for these claims by assessing the marginal costs associated with receipt of specialised care for all patients treated in English hospitals during 2008/09.
We estimate various multiple regressions in order, firstly, to establish the extent to which the receipt of specialised care is associated with higher treatment and, secondly, to evaluate hospital performance in controlling costs. We explore how robust the results are to a range of analytical choices by conducting various sensitivity analyses.
For some specialised markers our analysis suggests that costs are indeed higher than for other patients allocated to the same HRG. Our preferred model for evaluating the costs associated with receipt of specialised care accounts for the clustering of patients within hospital but ignores other patient characteristics that may not be adequately captured by the HRG to which the patient is allocated. We recommend a linear rather a logarithmic specification, as the estimates from the former are closer to those derived from generalised linear models, which could not be computed when allowance was made for clustering of patients in hospitals.
We find that, after allowing for the hospital in which treatment is provided, costs are higher than for other patients allocated to the same HRG if a patient receives one of the following types of specialised service:
 cystic fibrosis (38%),
 colorectal (21%) and  orthopaedic (21%).
The implication for Payment by Results is that 'top-up' payments for patients with these markers might be made over and above the tariff associated with the HRG to which they are allocated. This would ensure that the payment policy relating to specialised services is consistent with the patient-based reimbursement arrangements of Payment by Results. Additional payments would not be made in the presence of the other specialised care markers, there being insufficient evidence to suggest that the costs associated with these types of specialised care drive higher costs.
We recommend that the size of additional top-up amounts to the percentage increase in costs as reported above, these estimates being derived from our preferred model specification (the linear form of equation 2). However, different values could be adopted, justified on other grounds. These grounds may include:
 Materiality, where an additional top-up would have limited financial consequence for those types of specialised services that are delivered to only a small number of patients;  Sensitivity to model specification. The other model specifications generally imply lower top-up values than those recommended above, with the exception of a model that fails to allow for each hospital's influence on costs.
Our analysis demonstrates that there is substantial variation in the average cost of treatment across the hospital sector, and that this variation is due neither to differences in the factor prices faced by hospitals, nor to the provision of specialised services, and nor to the casemix, socio-demographic and diagnostic characteristics of each hospital's patients. After controlling for these diverse reasons for cost variation, we are able to rank hospitals according to their relative cost efficiency. Those hospitals rated as relatively inefficient will struggle financially under Payment by Results.
Appendix tables
We have seen in Table 2 that there has been a loss of approximately 2.3 million episodes due to the mismatch between the HES and the HRG4 databases. One of the reasons for this mismatch is that Reference Costs are not reported for some types of activity. These are reported in Table A1 . There remain 1.8m HES records without an associated Reference Cost. These are described by HRG chapter in Table A2 and by provider in Table A3 . 
